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ABSTRACT 
Earning management has become the practice in business. Yet, not all of the companies do 
this earning management. The study aims to investigate earnings management behavior 
measured by real and accruals transactions i.e. abnormal cash flow of operation, abnormal 
production cost, abnormal discretionary, short-term discretionary accruals, and long-term 
discretionary accruals. The study applies a perspective of prospect theory to predict earnings 
management behavior of management. In prospect theory, it is predicted that managers tend 
to manage earnings to avoid negative earnings. Positive earnings around zero is an indica-
tion of earnings managed to avoid negative earnings. It shows that most of Indonesian public 
companies tend to manage earnings based on real transactions than accruals transactions. 
All proxies of real earnings management support hypotheses that positive earnings around 
zero are managed through the real transactions. On contrary, only long-term discretionary 
accruals which support hypothesis revealing that positive earnings around zero is managed 
through accruals accounts. This result indicates that the Indonesian public companies en-
gage in earnings management in accordance with the predictions of prospect theory, espe-
cially those based on real transactions.  
 
Key words: Real Earnings Management, Accruals Earnings Management, Zero and Negative 
Earnings, and Positive Earnings Threshold. 
 
MANAJEMEN LABA AKRUAL DAN RIIL: 
TINJAUAN DARI PERSPEKTIF TEORI PROSPEK 
ABSTRAK 
Manajemen laba sudah menjadi praktik di dalam usaha. Namun, tidak semua perusahaan 
melakukan manajemen laba ini. Penelitian in bertujuan untuk meneliti perilaku manajemen 
laba yang diukur dengan transaksi riil dan akrual, misalnya abnormal cash flow of opera-
tion, abnormal production cost, abnormal discretionary, short-term discretionary accruals, 
dan long-term discretionary accrual. Penelitian ini menerapkan prospect theory yang mem-
prediksi perilaku manajemen laba. Dalam teori ini, diprediksikan bahwa manajer cenderung 
melakukan earning management untuk menghindari negative earning. Hasilnya menunjukan 
bahwa sebagian besar perusahaan di Indonesia cenderung mengelola penghasilan berdasar-
kan transaksi riil daripada akrual. Semua proksi manajemen laba riil mendukung hiposesis 
bahwa positive earning around zero ternyata dilakukan dengan transaksi riil. Sebaliknya, 
hanya pada diskresi akrual jangka panjang yang dilakukan dengan accrual accounts. Hasil 
ini menunjukkan bahwa perusahaan di Indonesia melakukan earning management sesuai 
dengan prediksi dari prospect theory, khususnya yang berdasarkan transaksi riil. 
 
Kata Kunci: Manajemen Laba Riil, Manajemen Laba Akrual, Laba Nihil dan Negatif, dan 
Ambang Laba Positif. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The fraudulence that has been accused so far 
has widespread throughout the globe. This 
practice related to the accounting problem 
has happened in some countries such Amer-
ica, Europe, and in Asia such as Enron, 
WorldCom, Xerox, Ahold and others. This 
existence has triggered accounting research 
topic, especially for earnings management. 
The information related to accounting cases 
revealed that some financial transactions 
have been manipulated and used as a basis 
for management companies to manage earn-
ings. This misbehavior is done in order to 
achieve a predetermined profit targets.  
The condition above seems to be inter-
esting for the researcher to study in more 
detail, especially related to earnings man-
agement practices. The more attractive is 
when such a study is based on the real cor-
porate transactions or activities related to the 
operation of the company's cash flow. Be-
sides that, it can also be based on accrual 
transactions. For example, the transactions 
related to cash flow of the company have a 
major influence on the company survival. 
When the company mismanages such opera-
tional transaction it will result in serious 
economic consequences than compared to 
that is merely the management of accrual-
based transaction. 
 Based on the assertions above, this re-
search attempts to reveal the earnings man-
agement. This management is based on the 
company's operational activities related to 
the company's operating cash flow and ac-
crual transactions that are in short term and 
long term. This research was formerly sup-
ported by the results of research in the last 
decade suggesting that more corporate man-
agers always manage their companies based 
on real transactions compared to the com-
pany's accrual transactions (Bushee 1998; 
Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal 2005; Roy-
chowdhury 2006). 
The theory used as the basis in this study 
is the theory which is based on the prospect 
theory. In general, the research on earnings 
management has been based on this theory 
which is, in fact, still relatively small. The 
studies of earnings management are always 
based on agency theory and positive ac-
counting theory. For example, research in 
Indonesia is still rarely found, especially 
those which are based on agency theory and 
the positive accounting theory. Thus, this 
study is expected to provide a significant 
contribution to the development of financial 
accounting research in particular for the 
study of earnings management. 
In connection with the theory, it can be 
referred to some proponents. For example, 
Kahneman and Tversky (1979), in this case, 
have developed prospect theory which states 
that decision makers perceive the advantages 
and disadvantages of a particular reference 
point instead of the absolute level of value. 
In particular, this study uses zero earnings as 
a reference point.  
As asserted above, the numbers around 
zero earnings can have both a positive and 
negative direction. However, the meaning of 
the same figure in different directions will 
provide very different meanings and slightly 
contradictory, especially for investors in the 
capital market. In this case, negative earn-
ings figures, even though it is small, it shows 
that the performance is not good. This is dif-
ferent from the number of positive earnings, 
despite it is a small, it has value. Positive 
earnings figure, though it is small, may indi-
cate a good performance.  
Therefore, the prospect theory assumes 
that if the company has small negative earn-
ings, they will manage it again to get posi-
tive earnings although its value is still small. 
Another advantage of this study is on the 
measurement of earnings management proxy 
variables. The implementation of earnings 
management proxy has its measurement 
model that is adapted to the conditions in 
Indonesia. For example, it can be done by 
adapting to one variable to another one vari-
able in ever estimation model.  
The estimation model of earnings man-
agement proxy can be formulated by the 
former creator (in the U.S.) in which it can-
not be directly be applied in Indonesia due to 
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the condition of different economies. There-
fore, it is necessary to adjust to the regres-
sion model in order to gain a better analysis. 
In addition, this study also applies prospect 
theory to distinguish between groups of 
companies suspected of earnings manage-
ment (suspected firms) and those which do 
not do earnings management (unsuspected 
firms) based on the condition of Indonesia.  
In the previous research, the measure-
ment instruments were used to differentiate 
the two groups of companies in terms of their 
return on assets (ROA). In contrast, this study 
uses the measurement of earnings per share 
(EPS). The argument is that the characters of 
public companies in Indonesia are still largely 
controlled individuals or families, who are 
often in a state between the majority share-
holders and management of being still fam-
ily-oriented (Benny S Tabalujan 2002; Claes-
sens, Djankov, & Lang 2000).  
The condition above indicates that the 
majority of the shareholders and manage-
ment are not always in conflict. However, 
the conflict even actually exists between the 
majority and minority shareholders (Claes-
sens et al. 2000; Fitri Ismiyanti & Putu 
Anom Mahadwartha 2008, La-Porta, Lopez-
de-Silanes, & Shleifer 1999). In that case, 
the EPS has become the center of attention 
by the shareholders, especially minority be-
cause EPS can reflect the company's growth 
and financial health.  
The interests of the shareholders towards 
the EPS can motivate managers to undertake 
earnings management in order to go beyond 
the limits of the previously EPS set targets 
(Bhojraj, Hribar, Picconi, & McInnis 2009; 
Charoenwong & Jiraporn 2009). Besides 
that, the distribution of profits is based EPS 
which is clearer in measuring the company's 
performance compared to that based on 
ROA. For example, the distribution of in-
come is to be used as the basis for classify-
ing into the group of companies between the 
suspected earnings management and that are 
not. This idea is expected to provide a sig-
nificant contribution in the development of 
theoretical accounting research in Indonesia. 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND 
HYPOTHESIS 
Prospect Theory 
Prospect theory has been developed by Kah-
neman & Tversky (1979). It is developed in 
behavioral economics that discusses the irra-
tional behavior. Furthermore, the prospect 
theory describes how the real human behav-
ior makes decisions under the conditions 
with risk and uncertainty. Individual behav-
ior is related to the existence of a range of 
options that are clearly not rational. From 
this perspective, prospect theory postulates 
that decision makers derive more value from 
the gains and losses with respect to a refer-
ence point instead of the absolute level of 
prosperity. 
In more specific discussion, prospect 
theory explains the diversification of deci-
sion or alternative based on the effect of the 
results that may be obtained from either of 
these options associated with prosperity. 
This theory assumes that a person in general 
tend to avoid the risk if all the changes asso-
ciated with prosperity are perceived to yield 
an advantage. On the contrary, the person 
will not like the risk when all the changes 
associated with the prosperity are perceived 
as a loss. If a function is described in the 
individual value, the individual value func-
tion is in the form of convex for a loss and 
concave for a profit. For that reason, the in-
dividual will derive the highest value when 
the prosperity moves on the loss to the 
profit. 
The application of prospect theory is 
clear. In relation to the performance of com-
panies in the capital markets, the existence 
can be in the forms of hope, and expecta-
tions by the investors about the company's 
performance. This can be related to the 
company's profit by criteria such as: (i) a 
positive earnings, (ii) greater profits than the 
previous year and (iii) higher profit than 
analysts forecast.  
All of this are expected to have a posi-
tive assessment of the implications of the 
company's stock price (Kinney, Burgstahler, 
& Martini 2002; Skinner & Sloan 2002). 
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Furthermore, in relation to the issues of cor-
porate performance, the prospect theory pro-
vides the advice, in which in the ceteris pari-
bus, the investors prefer investing in the 
companies that report a series of smaller 
profits than those with volatile earnings 
(Koonce & Mercer 2005). This argument 
can be clarified with the hypothesis of pros-
pect theory which states that a small loss is 
extremely more unpleasant than a small gain 
in the amount equal to the loss. This is due 
to the fact that reporting a small profit is ex-
pected to result in a higher valuation pre-
mium.  
The phenomenon of investors in the 
capital markets punish the companies that 
reported negative earnings despite the very 
small value may lead management to do 
something to avoid a negative earnings es-
pecially small value. Thus, profit exposure 
has been widely used as a key performance 
indicator of a company's commercial activi-
ties and it is also the main target of the man-
agement.  
The results of the survey on the Chief 
Financial Officers (CFOs) conducted by 
Graham et al. (2005) showed that the num-
ber of accounting earnings, especially earn-
ings per share (EPS) is a key figure that be-
comes focus of investors in the capital mar-
ket. This is because of the following: (1) 
investors require a reference (benchmark) to 
evaluate the performance of companies that 
can lower the cost of information processing 
in conjunction with the abundance of avail-
able information, (2) EPS is easy to obtain 
because, it is often announced by the media, 
(3) the analyst can make a prediction of the 
future value of a better company because 
they can base their assumptions on the rate 
of EPS, (4) the analysts evaluate the pro-
gress of the company based on EPS (Gra-
ham et al. 2005). 
 
Real and Accrual Earnings Management 
It is argued by Healy and Wahlen (1999) and 
Schipper (1989), that earnings management 
occurs when managers use policies in the 
preparation of the financial statements and 
structuring transactions to alter financial 
statements and trick the company's stake-
holders about the company's economic per-
formance or affect the outcome of the con-
tract depending on the figures of the ac-
counting reports. In other words, earnings 
management can be performed by managers 
through the accrual transactions or transac-
tions of real enterprises. 
The model of measurement should be 
based on the accrual transaction and the 
earnings management (discretionary accru-
als or DA) which remains considered unable 
to reveal the full details of earnings man-
agement. This is because the model ignores 
the relationship between the transaction of 
cash flows and accruals (Dechow, Sloan, & 
Sweeney 1995; Guay, Kothari, & Watts 
1996; Kothari 2001; Kothari, Leone, and 
Wasley 2005; Subramanyam 1996).  
Thus, the measurement model of earn-
ings management that uses the value of DA 
also finds difficulty in expressing the exact 
pattern of the distribution of earnings man-
aged the company manager (Beaver, 
McNichols, and Nelson 2003; Dechow, 
Richardson, and Tuna 2003). Criticisms are 
asserted by Kothari et al. (2005) who has 
developed a model modification `from Jones 
(1991). They integrated with the company's 
performance that is return on assets (ROA). 
The results of the development of this 
model show that the model has a stronger 
predictive power than the previous model 
because the model was able to provide addi-
tional control over the proxy of earnings 
management. Based on this argument so this 
study uses a model modification Jones com-
bined with the performance of the model, 
known as Kothari et al. (2005). Furthermore, 
this study separates DA values, combined 
with the performance of a short-term (short-
term DA) and long term (long-term DA). 
This is done in order to know more detail 
about the patterns used by managers in man-
aging corporate profits in particular are 
based on accrual transactions. 
The next development in the measure-
ment of earnings management leads to 
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measurement based on distortion or manipu-
lation of operational activities of the com-
pany. For example, the measurement of 
earnings management has been found with 
empirical evidence by Bushee (1998), 
Dechow and Sloan (1991), Graham et al. 
(2005) and Roychowdhury (2006). In this 
case, the company's operating cash flows 
have the same opportunities accrual transac-
tions in relation to the practice of earnings 
management (Myers, Myers, & Skinner 
2007). 
Some transaction policies are generally 
intervened by the managers such as the ac-
celeration of sales, changes in delivery 
schedules, and delays in research and devel-
opment, expenses and maintenance costs 
(Healy & Wahlen 1999). Management inter-
vention is referred to in some literature as a 
form of real earnings management. For ex-
ample, Roychowdhury (2006) defines real 
earnings management as a form of earnings 
management which is done through manipu-
lating the company's operational activities.  
Such manipulation above s measured in 
the presence of a deviation from the normal 
practice of the company's operations. Man-
agement motivation to do this is the desire to 
"trick" the company's financial reporting for 
the stakeholders in order to meet certain 
goals. This distortion is not actually adding 
value to the company but merely to meet 
reporting goals for managers. 
The definition of Roychowdhury is con-
sistent with the results of studies by Graham 
et al. (2005) who found evidence that there 
is the following tendency: (a) financial ex-
ecutives weighed several transaction policy 
that aims to meet profit targets as profit is 
not negative, the same as the previous earn-
ings and forecasts from analysts, (b) finance 
executives also wanted to manipulate real 
activities in order to meet targets through 
aggressive price cuts to boost sales volume, 
and increased production volumes.  
The practice above can result in lower 
sales margins. Yet, empirical evidence on 
the existence of real earnings management is 
always related to the opportunity to lower 
the costs of research and development (R & 
D) to increase the profits of the company 
(Bens, Nagar, & Wong 2002; Bushee 1998). 
Bens et al. (2002) suggests that managers 
buying back all shares to avoid the negative 
effects of diluted EPS which is funded by 
the cost research and development costs. On 
the contrary, Bushee (1998) found that the 
decrease in research and development costs 
is done in order to meet earnings bench-
marks. 
The next evidence of the real earnings 
management is associated with a decrease in 
discretionary costs identified by Graham et 
al. (2005) which states that fund managers 
do more real earnings management in the 
form of reduced costs compared with the 
transaction discretionary accruals. The exis-
tence of real earnings management is also 
related to sales transactions, operating cash 
flow, cash production costs and administra-
tive activities of the company. It was found 
by Roychowdhury (2006) and Bartov 
(1993). The Company made real earnings 
management in order to avoid negative earn-
ings and zero earnings. Some are used to 
manipulate in order to acquire an abnormal 
operational activity as described by (Roy-
chowdhury 2006) as the following. 
1. Sales manipulation refers to speeding up 
sales and making additional sales which is 
not maintained through increased price dis-
counts or extended credit terms. This is done 
in order to increase operating cash flow. 
2. Decrease in discretionary cash costs. 
3. Overestimate the production of goods in 
order to report the cost of goods sold is lower. 
Earnings per share (EPS) as a reference 
for managers was found in Bhojrat et al  
(2009) that suggest that corporate managers 
in America conducted earnings management 
to meet EPS targets predicted by financial 
analysts. Furthermore, EPS is used as a ref-
erence by managers for performing particu-
lar earnings management to avoid reporting 
negative earnings also found by Charoen-
wong & Jiraporn (2009). The results of these 
studies indicate that managers of public 
companies in Singapore and Thailand per-
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form earnings management in order to avoid 
losses and negative earnings growth. 
Based on the arguments and assertion as 
based on some literature reviews, the follow-
ing hypotheses are raised in this research. 
H1: Managers do real earnings management to 
avoid negative EPS by increasing cash flow of 
the operations. 
H2: Managers do real earnings management to 
avoid negative EPS by increasing the number 
of production or increasing the end inventory 
of finished goods. 
H3: Managers do real earnings management to 
avoid negative EPS by minimizing the costs of 
discretionary cash. 
H4: Managers do accrual earnings manage-
ment to avoid negative EPS by minimizing the 
burden of short-term discretionary accruals. 
H5: Managers do accrual earnings manage-
ment to avoid negative EPS by minimizing the 
burden of long-term discretionary accruals. 
 
RESEARCH METHOD 
Population and Sample 
The population in this research includes pub-
lic companies in Indonesia listed during 
1995 to 2006, selected by purposive sam-
pling method. The number of sample is 97 
firms for 12 years or 1164 observations 
(company year). The criteria and number of 
samples selected are as shown in Table 1. 
This study takes the sample of the com-
panies which are classified as industrial 
manufactures sector with the proxy measure 
of earnings management that is cost of pro-
duction. The expense of production is only 
in the industrial manufacture sector. In addi-
tion, the number of Indonesian public com-
panies is mostly the companies of manufac-
tures. The criteria defined above are aimed 
to reduce bias in the data analysis. 
 
Type and Sources of Data 
The data were taken from the financial 
statements of the Capital Market Pojok BEI 
Universitas Brawijaya Database and of the 
Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) through 
the website www.idx.co.id.  
 
DATA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
Descriptive statistics of research data is pre-
sented in Table 2. Table 2 shows that most of 
the research data have a mean value which is 
higher than the value of the standard deviation. 
This condition indicates that the data are nor-
mally distributed and did not show any remote 
data. It can support the analysis of the data so 
as to avoid violating the assumptions of classi-
cal regression equations which are made. 
 
Measurement of Earnings Management 
Proxy 
There are five proxies of earnings manage-
ment (a combination of real and accrual earn-
ings management), in which 3 proxies are 
based on the operating activities of the com-
panies that are involved in real Abnormal op-
erating cash flow (Abn.CFO), abnormal pro-
duction costs in cash (Abn.PROD), and the 
expense of discretionary cash (Abn.DISCR) 
and 2 proxies are based on the accrual account 
of the short-term discretionary accruals (DA 
SHORT), and long-term discretionary accruals 
(DA LONG). SHORT DA and LONG DA 
refer to the model of Kothari et al. (2005) 
which are broken up into two parts, namely 
Table 1 
Procedures of Sampling 
 
Description Number 
The number of companies listed on the Stock Exchange in 2006 339 
The listed companies are less than 12 years (1995-2006)  42 
Companies that are not included as manufacture sector 178 
The companies not the accounting period ended on 31 December 2 
Companies whose financial statements are in Euro 4 
Companies whose financial statements are not complete 16 
Number of Sample  97 
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short-term and long-term. 
This study applies the modifications in 
calculating the value of earnings manage-
ment proxies, namely the transformation of 
the logarithm of the value of total assets in 
each model of the estimation. The purpose 
of this modification is to obtain a better 
analysis. This is done because the value of 
the variable 1 / At-1 (total assets) in the es-
timation model produces the 0 from all ob-
servations. Therefore, if it is processed in the 
analysis, it will not obtain the coefficients 
for these variables Thus, the model estimates 
produces regression parameter after modifi-
cation as the following. 
a. Activity cash flow of operation  
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b. Activities production cost 
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c. Activity of discretionary expense 
εαα β tttttt ASAADISCR Log +++= −−−− )/()./1(/ 111101  (3)  
Description: 
At-1 = Total asset of the company at year t-1. 
St = Sales of the company at year t-1 
ΔSt = Changes in sales of the company year t-
1. 
ΔSt-1= Changes of sales of the company year 
t-1 and t-2 
α, β = Constant and Regression coefficient  
ε = Error term at the end of year t 
The abnormal value of each activity is 
calculated from the difference between the 
actual activity and the expected value of the 
activity. The measurement model is devel-
oped by Roychowdhury (2006). The ex-
pected value of the activity is calculated 
based on the regression coefficients of each 
estimation model. 
d. Short-term discretionary accruals 
(SHORT_DA) 
SHORT DA is calculated from the difference 
between the total short-term accruals (STACC) 
and a total real short-term accruals predicted 
from the model estimates. The formula for cal-
culating the DA SHORT is as follows. 
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Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics Research Data (in Millions of US $ unless ROA and EPS) 
 
 Mean Median Standard Deviation 
Sales 2,523,298 3,810,250 2,406,584
Operating Cash flow 245,339 239,910 113,286 
Cash Production Cost 474,351 462,992 301,886 
Discretional Cash Cost 981,220 837,688 233,865
Total of Accrual 5,299,280 3,605,000 430,462
Short term accrual 607,243 749,500 478,774
Long term accrual 1,238,556 1,929,000 1,076,491
Net Earnings 564,456 965,500 549,731
Earnings per share (EPS) 228 318 167
Total of Asset 1,611,099 1,399,749 743,965
Log. Of total asset 5.710 5.600 0.583
Account receivables 1,317,612 1,655,600 972,936
Inventories 1,375,023 1,400,320 1,264,572
Other current assets 441,223 520,158 359,033
Account payables 1,394,363 1,559,400 350,470
Payable tax 145,293 193,000 97,967
Other accounts payables 253,908 364,260 174,738
Fixed assets 873,432 932,415 659,295
Intangible assets 92,373 127,100 73,191
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Description: 
SHORT Dai, t = Discretionary accrual term 
company i at year end t 
STACCj, t = Total real short-term accruals 
for company i in year t 
ΔREVj, t = sales in year t less revenues in 
year t-1 company 
ΔRECj, t = t Accounts receivable subtracted 
by accounts receivable in year t-1 company i 
INC it = net income in year t of company i 
Ait-1 = total assets of company i in year t-1 
e. Long-term discretionary accruals (DA 
LONG) 
LONG DA is calculated from the difference 
between total accruals real long-term and long-
term total accruals predicted by the model esti-
mate. The formula for a LONG DA is: 
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Description: 
LONG DAit = Discretionary accrual of 
long-term of company i at year end t 
LTACCj, t = Total real long-term accrual of 
company i year t 
IETC, t = Total fixed assets of company i in 
year t 
INTJs, t = i intangible assets in year t 
INCj.t = Net income for firm i in year t 
Ait-1 = total assets of firm i in year t-1 
The results of the analysis associated 
with the estimation model for each of the 
earnings management proxies are presented 
in Table 3. In Table 3, it is described that the 
regression coefficients were used to estimate 
the value of the transaction and the opera-
tional activities of the normal accrual ac-
counts. Such a table shows that all the coef-
ficients of the variables used to estimate the 
activity is significant. This means that the 
Table 3 
The Parameter of Regression for Each Earning Management Proxy 
 
 CFOt/At-1 PRODt/At-1 DISCRt/At-1 STACCt/At-1 LTACCt/At-1
Intercept 0.039 -0.074 0.127** 0.186** 0.163 
 (1.740) (-0.696) (3.856) (3.123) (1.842) 
1/Log.At-1 -0.139** 0.523** 0.407** 0.069** 0.875* 
 (-3.617) (5.876) (3.040) (3.208) (2.903) 
St/At-1 0.049** 0.667**    
 (7.050) (44.265)    
ΔSt/At-1 -0.001** 0.067*    
 (-4.171) (2.398)    
ΔSt-1/At-1  -0.093**    
  (-3.266)    
St-1/At-1   0.092**   
   (8.398)   
(ΔREVt–ΔRECt)/At-1    0.064**  
    (2.941)  
PPEt/At-1     0.161** 
     (5.043) 
INTt/At-1     -0.190** 
     (-5.209) 
INCt/At-1    0.265** -0.264* 
    (2.942) (-2.164) 
F-value 17.186** 766.933** 40.185** 6.336** 15.086** 
Adjusted R2 0.041 0.725 0.063 0.044 0.066 
*Significant level at 5%. **Significant level at 1%.  
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regression model is accurate. The size of the 
highest explanatory power indicated by the 
model for production activity is equal to 
72.5%. The lowest explanatory power for 
operating cash flow activity is equal to 
4.1%. On the contrary, the explanatory 
power is 6.3% for the activity of discretion-
ary expenses, totaled to 4.4% for short-term 
discretionary accruals, and by 6.6% for long-
term discretionary accruals. The estimation 
of each proxy for earnings management if it 
is presented in the form of descriptive statis-
tics is presented in Table 4. 
All regression models which were used to 
estimate the proxy of earnings management 
have also been free of problems autocorrela-
tion, multicollinearity, and heteroscedasticity. 
Gujarati (2003) states, that the regression 
model is free from autocorrelation problem if 
the Durbin-Watson statistic is between 
DWupper (Table) and 4 - DWupper (DWup-
per <DWStatistic <4 - DW upper). Autocorre-
lation test summary is presented in Table 5. 
The next is that the multicollinearity test 
results are based on the correlation among 
the independent variables of each regression 
model. This shows that the correlation be-
tween among independent variables is below 
0.50 (50%). Problem dealing with hetero-
scedasticity of each regression model was 
formerly tested with the Park test. The test 
results showed that all the coefficients of the 
independent variables of the Park test were 
not significant. This means that all of the 
regression models used to estimate earnings 
management proxy is free of problems deal-
ing with heteroscedasticity. 
 
Sensitivity Analysis on Estimation Model 
of Earning Management Proxy 
An adjustment is applied in any regression 
model of the variables 1/log as the replace-
ment of the variable 1/At-1. This was done 
in order to obtain the results of better regres-
sion parameters.. The results of the compari-
son of the model parameters are adjusted to 
the model without adjusting as in Table 6. 
As illustrated in Table 6, most of the pa-
rameters of the regression model modifica-
tions are better than those without modifica-
tion, i.e. for parameter R2, adjusted R2, and 
most of the regression coefficients. The ap-
plications may produce logarithmic function 
coefficients. In contrast, the model without 
modification does not result in regression 
coefficients of variables 1/At-1. Empirical 
evidence indicates that the application of 
earnings management model with modifica-
tions can obtain better results because it can 
increase the amount of explanatory power of 
Table 4 
The Value of Each Earning management Proxy 
 
Proxy Mean Median Std.Deviation 
Abnormal CFO 0.172 0.186 0.145 
Abnormal PROD 0.671 0.798 0.380 
Abnormal DISCR 0.273 0.277 0.251 
SHORT Discretionary accruals 0.398 0.252 0.293 
LONG Discretionary accruals 0.316 0.302 0.293 
 
Table 5 
Test Results of Authocorrelation on the Model of Each Earning Management Proxy 
 
 DWUpper (DWTabel) DWStatistic 4 - DWUpper
Abnormal CFO 1.799 1.911 2.201 
Abnormal PROD 1.810 1.978 2.190 
Abnormal DISCR 1.789 1.926 2.211 
SHORT Discretionary accruals 1.799 1.946 2.201 
LONG Discetionary accruals 1.810 1.901 2.190 
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the model used. This, of course, will have an 
impact on the results of the estimated value 
of better discretionary accruals. 
 
Classification of Samples 
Grouping samples into "samples identified 
practice of earnings management" and 
"samples identified no practice of earnings 
management" function for measurement 
dummy variables in the regression analysis 
on hypothesis testing. Grouping refers to the 
idea put forward by Hayn (1995), followed 
by Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) and Roy-
chowdhury (2006). The procedure is based 
on the distribution of profits.  
The researcher uses the distribution of 
income based on the value of ROA. How-
ever, in this study the distribution of income 
is referred to the distribution of earnings per 
share (EPS). As has been mentioned earlier, 
Table 6 
Comparison of Model Estimation between Modification and non Modification 
 
 With Modification Without Modification
A. Abnormal CFO   
 R Squared 0.043 0.032 
 Adjusted R Square 0.040 0.031 
 Coefficient 1/ Log.At-1 -0.139 - 
 Coefficient 1/ At-1 - - 
 Coefficient St/ At-1 0.048 0.046 
 Coefficient ΔSt/ At-1 -0.001 -0.059 
B. Abnormal PROD   
 R Square 0.726 0.705 
 Adjusted R Square 0.724 0.684 
 Coefficient 1/ Log.At-1 0.523 - 
 Coefficient 1/ At-1 - - 
 Coefficient St/ At-1 0.667 0.640 
 Coefficient ΔSt/ At-1 0.067 -0.065 
 Coefficient ΔSt/ At-1 -0.093 -0.095 
C. Abnormal DISCR   
 R Square 0.065 0.039 
 Adjusted R Square 0.063 0.031 
 Coefficient 1/ Log.At-1 0.407 - 
 Coefficient 1/ At-1 - - 
 Coefficient St-1/ At-1 0.092 0.085 
D. Short-term DA   
 R Square 0.056 0.013 
 Adjusted R Square 0.044 0.010 
 Coefficient 1/ Log.At-1 0.069 - 
 Coefficient 1/ At-1 - - 
 Coefficient (ΔREVt – 
ΔRECt)/ At-1 
0.064 0.063 
 Coefficient INCt/ At-1 0.092 0.086 
E. Long-term DA   
 R Square 0.089 0.046 
 Adjusted R Square 0.066 0.044 
 Coefficient 1/ Log.At-1 0.875 - 
 Coefficient 1/ At-1 - - 
 Coefficient PPEt/ At-1 0.161 0.145 
 Coefficient INTt/ At-1 -0.190 0.135 
 Coefficient INCt/ At-1 -0.264 -0.262 
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the idea for the investigation of the practice 
of earnings management refers to the pros-
pect theory, which uses a reference point in 
making a decision. Reference point in this 
study is the zero profit (zero earnings).  
The condition of "negative earnings 
around zero earnings" (loss of small value) is 
an extremely adverse circumstances and risk 
managers. Therefore, managers are motivated 
acts perform earnings management to change 
the direction of the negative into a positive 
profit with relatively small as well. This 
means that companies with "positive earnings 
around zero profit" is a company that is sus-
pected of earnings management practices. 
This study applies the value of EPS 
which refers to the rate of the Rupiah against 
the U.S. Dollar ($). For 1995 and 1996, the 
average exchange rate of rupiah against the 
U.S. dollar is $ 2.500, while for 1997 to 
2006 is $ 10,000. Based on the condition 
that the limit value of EPS for 1995 and 
1996 is totaled up to Rp 125 (5% of 1 U.S. $ 
= U.S. $ 250) and Rp 500 (5% of 1US $ = 
Rp 10,000) for 1997 to 2006. This means 
that in 1995 and 1996 EPS samples having 
between zero and up to $ 125 is a sample of 
the identified conduct earnings management. 
Meanwhile, for 1997 through 2006 EPS 
samples have between zero and 500, this is 
identified to conduct earnings management. 
The number and distribution of samples in 
the group of the companies practice earnings 
management are presented in Table 7. 
Furthermore, the data in Table 7 are used 
as the basis for subsequent analysis, which is 
a variable dummy in hypothesis testing. The 
samples are identified to conduct earnings 
management will be given a value of 1. Oth-
erwise, samples were not identified conduct 
earnings management was given a value of 0. 
 
Hypothesis Testing Results 
By using regression analysis, the result of 
hypothesis testing is the following. This re-
fers to the regression model Roychowdhury 
(2006) adapted to the conditions of this study. 
Roychodhury uses dummy variables ROA, 
whereas this study uses a dummy variable 
Dummy EPS and coupled with the financial 
crisis. Regression model is as follows. 
Yt = α0 + α1 (Dm_Crisis) + α2 (Dm_Post) 
+ β1 (Dm_EPS) t + β2 (SIZE) t + εt (6) 
Description: 
Yt = Proxy earnings management is Abn.CFO 
(H1), Abn.PROD (H2), Abn.DISCR (H3) 
HORT DA (H4), and LONG DA (H5). 
Dm_Crisis = Dummy to the economic crisis 
the value of 1 for the period of economic 
crisis, i.e. 1997 and 1998, 0 for others). 
Dm_Post = Dummy for after the economic 
crisis, the value of 1 for the period after the 
economic crisis, the year 1999 to 2006, 0 for 
others) 
Table 7 
Distribution of Sample Indicated of Earning Management 
 
Based on Exchange Rate US $ Based on Exchange Rate EURO (€)Year Identified Unidentified Identified Unidentified 
1995 26 71 - - 
1996 50 47 - - 
1997 32 65 - - 
1998 26 71 - - 
1999 55 42 - - 
2000 32 65 - - 
2001 57 40 - - 
2002 55 42 56 41 
2003 52 45 54 43 
2004 52 45 52 45 
2005 58 39 59 38 
2006 60 37 60 37  
Total 555 609 281 204 
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Dm_EPS = Dummy for grouping samples (a 
value of 1 for the sample identified conduct 
earnings management, 0 for others). 
SIZE = firm size is calculated from the value 
of Log. Total assets are the control variables. 
α = constant regression coefficient β = ε = 
residual term 
The results of the analysis for hypothesis 
testing are presented in Table 8. Table 8 de-
scribes that Dummy EPS coefficient is signifi-
cant at 1% level for regression Abnormal Op-
erating cash flow with a coefficient of 0.082; 
Abnormal Production Expenses coefficient is 
0.042. These results indicate that hypothesis 1 
which states that positive earnings around zero 
is identified to manage earnings by increasing 
operating cash flow and hypothesis 2, which 
states that positive earnings around zero is 
identified not to manage earnings by increas-
ing the production of goods as ending inven-
tory. With a great ending inventory is expected 
to reduce the cost of goods sold. 
The result of hypothesis testing 3 is indi-
cated by the coefficient for the proxy Dummy 
EPS Abnormal Discretionary Expenses that is 
of-0032 which is significant at 5% level. This 
means that the positive earnings around zero 
are managed by minimizing the costs of dis-
cretionary cash. In contrast, the result of hy-
pothesis testing 4 shows the rejection of the 
hypothesis since the coefficient for EPS 
Dummy proxy for Short-Term Discretionary 
Accruals is -0017 insignificant. This means 
that the company does not undertake accrual 
earnings management on short-term transac-
tions. Furthermore, the coefficient for the 
proxy Dummy EPS Long-Term Discretionary 
Accrual is -0011 which is significant at the 1% 
level. These results indicate support for hy-
pothesis 5, which states that a positive profit 
earning around zero is managed by minimiz-
ing the long-term discretionary accruals. 
Earnings management behavior, as 
measured by the proxy 5 is apparently not 
affected the size of the company. For exam-
ple, the large companies and small ones have 
the same behavior in the practice of earnings 
management. This indication is shown by 
the absence of a significant coefficient of 
company size in the regression analysis. 
The result related to economic conditions 
in Indonesia shows that earnings management 
behavior is done by operating cash flow activ-
ity, discretionary expenses, and account long-
term discretionary accruals which is the differ-
ence between the economic crisis and beyond 
the economic crisis. During the economic cri-
sis, the tendency is to increase operating cash 
flow, reduce discretionary expenses in cash 
and long-term accrued expenses. In contrast, 
the behavior of earnings management that is 
based on the activity of production expenses 
and accounts short-term discretionary accruals 
shows no significant difference. 
Table 8 
Results of Regression Analyzes to Test the Hypothesis 
 
 Abn.CFO Abn.PROD Abn.DISCR Short DA Long DA 
Konstanta -0.024 -0.006 0.018 0.024 -0.036 
 (-0.637) (-0.061) (0.266) (0.423) (-0.467) 
Dm_Krisis 0.056** -0.019 -0.027** -0.007 -0.106** 
 (3.792) (-0.478) (-3.035) (-0.295) (-5.539) 
Dm_Post 0.010 -0.005 0.011 -0.017 -0.042 
 (0.824) (-0.147) (0.530) (-0.918) (-1.717) 
Dm EPS 0.082** 0.042** -0.032* -0.017 -0.011** 
 (5.096) (3.861) (-2.115) (-1.266) (-4.072) 
Size 0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 0.012 
 (0.228) (-0.077) (-0.213) (-0.074) (0.862) 
F-statistic 4.881** 4.030** 4.522** 0.806 5.932** 
R-squared 0.156 0.134 0.151 0.003 0.003 
Adjusted R2 0.126 0.120 0.136 0.001 0.001 
*Significant at the level 0.05, **Significant at the 0.01. 
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CONCLUSION, IMPLICATION, SUG-
GESTION, AND LIMITATIONS 
It can be generalized that the Indonesian 
public companies tend to perform earnings 
management practices based on real opera-
tional activities. In turn, the earnings man-
agement practices can be triggered by any 
chance related to the concentrated nature of 
corporate title deeds. Most of the public 
companies in Indonesia are a combination of 
business and not a single business unit. This 
condition provides an opportunity for man-
agers to practice earnings management 
through operational activities by conducting 
transactions with affiliated companies or 
subsidiaries that are not normal. This is done 
in order to cover losses or profit targets set.  
Furthermore, earnings management prac-
tices as practiced above should be relatively 
difficult to detect, even by the auditors be-
cause everything is planned and supported by 
a valid proof of the transaction. Another gen-
eralization is related to the evidence that earn-
ings management practices are still done by 
using the accrual account. This practice is 
still done by the company because of the 
flexibility of accounting standards. 
The research concerns the management 
practices is still very attractive for further 
investigation especially if associated with 
operational activities of the company. In fact, 
the company's activities are always associated 
with good cash flow from operations and 
other activities such as financing and invest-
ment. Therefore, the development of a proxy 
of earnings management models still need to 
be developed continuously in relation to the 
manifold types of transactions. 
The transactions above are related to the 
firm's cash flows for operating activities, in-
vesting or financing activities. Thus, the ap-
plication prospect theory in earnings man-
agement behavior should be done by using a 
reference point indicating zero profit on the 
behavior of managers in anticipating risk 
managers. This can be caused by the loss suf-
fered by the company. For further research, it 
is important for the application of prospect 
theory which is the context of management 
behavior. The researchers can also use other 
reference points such as the anticipation of a 
decline in profits or earnings targets. 
This study focuses on the industrial sector 
of manufacturing companies. Besides that, it is 
related to the measurement model of earnings 
management that might not be applicable in 
other sectors such as the cost of production. 
Therefore, the next study is necessarily to de-
velop a measurement model that can be ap-
plied to all industry sectors. Measurement 
model can be associated with the activities of 
the company's more general nature. This can 
be applied to all sectors of industry such as 
associated with the companies related to in-
vestment or financing activities. This is be-
cause the financing and investing activities of 
a public company is really important to study. 
There are already a variety of financial instru-
ments to do such instruments and derivatives 
hedgers. This condition is very attractive when 
these kinds of companies are investigated in 
relation to the development of the proxy for 
earnings management measurement model. 
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